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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44573
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) JEROME COUNTY NO. CR 2012-3408
v. )
)





STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Francisco Vazquez-Guzman contends the district court abused its discretion
when it revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence in this case.  He
asserts a sufficient consideration of the mitigating factors in the record demonstrates
probation was still the best alternative for achieving the goal of rehabilitation, and
ultimately, the protection of society.  Therefore, this Court should vacate the order
revoking probation and remand this case for an order returning Mr. Vasquez-Guzman to
probation.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Vazquez-Guzman initially pled guilty to felony joy riding in this case.1
(R., pp.169-70.)  He was twenty-one years old at the time, and the instant offense
constituted his first felony conviction.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI), pp.2, 7-10.)  He had grown up with his grandmother in Mexico, working to help
feed his family, before eventually immigrating to the United States to live with an uncle.
(PSI, p.11.)  Mr. Vazquez-Guzman had aspirations of joining the Marines.  (PSI, p.11.)
The district court ultimately decided to impose a unified sentence of five years, which it
suspended for a three-year term of probation.  (R., pp.180-88.)
Three months later, the State filed a motion to revoke probation.  (R., pp.203-08.)
Mr. Vazquez-Guzman ultimately admitted that allegation.  (R., p.239.)  The district court
decided to allow Mr. Vazquez-Guzman ninety days to get himself back in compliance
with the terms of probation, but he was unsuccessful.  (See R., pp.250-60.)  As a
result, the district court revoked his probation, but retained jurisdiction over the case.
(R., pp.267-74.)
Mr. Vazquez-Guzman performed well during the period of retained jurisdiction,
completing two of his three assigned programs.  (PSI, p.40.)  Rider staff members also
noted that, while Mr. Vazquez-Guzman did have some issues with accepting
responsibility for his actions, “he was honest with [the staff] and did not try to make
excuses” in regard to the three informal disciplinary sanctions he received during that
1 He also pleaded guilty to misdemeanor driving without privileges.  (R., p.169.)  The
district court imposed a sentence of 180 days in jail on that charge, and awarded him
credit for 181 days of presentence incarceration.  (R., p.186.)  Other charges for driving
under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident were dismissed pursuant to
the plea agreement.  (R., p.169.)
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program.  (PSI, p.41.)  The rider staff recommended the district court suspend
Mr. Vazquez-Guzman’s sentence for another period of probation, which the district court
did.  (PSI, p.39; R., pp.282-86.)
The district court held a status conference three months later, at which time, it
acknowledged Mr. Vazquez-Guzman was complying with all the terms of his probation
except his financial obligations.  (R., p.309.)  However, Mr. Vazquez-Guzman reported
that he had been working two jobs in an effort to address those obligations.  (R., p.309.)
Nearly a year after the end of his rider program, however, Mr. Vazquez-Guzman
began struggling on probation again, and the State ultimately moved to revoke his
probation.  (R., pp.310-14.)  Mr. Vazquez-Guzman entered admissions to all but one of
those allegations.2  (Tr., p.5, Ls.1-7.)  At the ensuing disposition hearing, defense
counsel explained that Mr. Vazquez-Guzman had begun taking steps to get into the
Victory Home inpatient program.  (Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.2.)  She explained
Mr. Vazquez-Guzman was concerned that prison would not provide a forum for him to
continue rehabilitating, and so, wanted to present the district court with a viable
sentencing alternative.  (Tr., p.20, Ls.9-14.)
Defense counsel also explained that Mr. Vazquez-Guzman’s struggles on
probation had begun when he decided to try and financially support his ailing father,
who was living in Mexico, in addition to paying child support for his three children.
(Tr., p.20, L.20 - p.21, L.9.)  That led, for example, to a point “where he felt, wrongfully,
that work was more important than doing the treatment.”  (Tr., p.21, Ls.5-7.)  He took
responsibility for his actions.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.19-20.)  Defense counsel also noted that,
2 The State withdrew the remaining allegation.  (See Tr., p.5, Ls.1-12; R., p.341.)
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despite the allegations of missed treatment, Mr. Vazquez-Guzman reported being able
to maintain his sobriety.  (Tr., p.21, Ls.19-22; see generally R., pp.310-11, 328-30
(alleging various violations of the terms of probation, but not use of alcohol); compare
R., pp.207, 258-59 (reports of violation form previous period of probation alleging
Mr. Vazquez-Guzman had alcohol in his home and had admitted to drinking alcohol).)
Finally, defense counsel reported that Mr. Vazquez-Guzman had begun participating in
the “RUI” program.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.1-6.)
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that, despite the opportunities which
had been afforded to Mr. Vazquez-Guzman, probation was not serving the goals of
rehabilitation or protection of society.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.18-24.)  As a result, it revoked his
probation and executed his underlying sentence.  (Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.1; R., pp.360-
61.)  Mr. Vazquez-Guzman filed a pro se notice of appeal, which was timely from the
order revoking his probation.  (R., pp.366-68; See Order Granting Motion to Clarify
Jurisdiction, dated March 8, 2017.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Vazquez-Guzman’s
probation and executed his underlying sentence.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Vazquez-Guzman’s
Probation And Executed His Underlying Sentence
The decision to revoke probation is one within the district court’s discretion.
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000).  A district court abuses its
discretion when it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion, acts beyond the outer
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limits of that discretion, or does not reach a decision based on an exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601 (1989).  When deciding whether or not to revoke
probation, the district court must determine “whether the probation is achieving the goal
of rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the
protection of society.” Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312.  In this case, a sufficient consideration
of the mitigating factors demonstrates the district court did not reach its decision by an
exercise of reason, as continuing Mr. Vazquez-Guzman’s probation would be more
consistent with rehabilitation and protection of society.
As defense counsel noted, Mr. Vazquez-Guzman’s most recent struggles with
probation had arisen out of a desire to be a constructive member of society – by his
decision to prioritize paying child support for his three children and helping to provide
support to his ailing father, and thus, choosing to focus on work rather than treatment.
(Tr., p.20, L.20 - p.21, L.7.)  Additionally, probation was, contrary to the district court’s
conclusion, making some progress toward rehabilitation.  For example, there were no
allegations that Mr. Vazquez-Guzman had failed to maintain his sobriety during this
period of probation.  (Tr., p.21, Ls.19-22; see generally R., pp.310-11, 328-30.)  That is
particularly noteworthy, since alcohol abuse had played a significant role in his original
criminal conduct and had been an issue during his previous period of probation.  (See
PSI, pp.5-7; R., pp.207, 258-59.)  As the Idaho Supreme Court has acknowledged, a
younger offender, like Mr. Vazquez-Guzman (see PSI, p.2), should be treated more
leniently because he is still maturing, and still able to become a productive member of
society. See, e.g., State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980).
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Furthermore, as Mr. Vazquez-Guzman pointed out, revoking his probation and
executing his sentence would not more effectively serve the goal of rehabilitation.  (See
Tr., p.20, Ls.9-11.)  That is why he presented the district court with a sentencing
alternative in the Victory Home program.  (Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.14.)  While protection
of society is the primary goal of sentencing, “rehabilitation, particularly of first offenders,
should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.”
State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in
State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).  Mr. Vazquez-Guzman is precisely the sort of
defendant to which the McCoy Court was referring.  (See, e.g., PSI, pp.7-10 (indicating
the instant offense was Mr. Vazquez-Guzman’s first felony conviction).)
Therefore, a sufficient consideration of all the mitigating factors in the record
indicates probation, particularly with the inpatient option of the Victory Home program,
would still better serve the goals of rehabilitation and protection of society.  As such, the
district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Vazquez-Guzman’s probation and
executing his underlying sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Vazquez-Guzman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order
revoking his probation and remand this case for an order returning him to probation.
DATED this 21st day of March, 2017.
___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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